Malicious Chrome and Edge Add-Ons Had a Novel Way To Hide On 3 Million Devices

In December, Ars reported that as many as 3 million people had been infected by Chrome and Edge browser extensions that stole personal data and redirected users to ad or phishing sites. Now, the researchers who discovered the scam have revealed the lengths the extension developers took to hide their nefarious deeds. Ars Technica reports:

Researchers from Prague-based Avast said on Wednesday that the extension developers employed a novel way to hide malicious traffic sent between infected devices and the command and control servers they connected to. Specifically, the extensions funneled commands into the cache-control headers of traffic that was camouflaged to appear as data related to Google analytics, which websites use to measure visitor interactions. Referring to the campaign as CacheFlow, Avast researchers wrote: “CacheFlow was notable in particular for the way that the malicious extensions would try to hide their command and control traffic in a covert channel using the Cache-Control HTTP header of their analytics requests. We believe this is a new technique. In addition, it appears to us that the Google Analytics-style traffic was added not just to hide the malicious commands, but that the extension authors were also interested in the analytics requests themselves. We believe they tried to solve two problems, command and control and getting analytics information, with one solution.”

The extensions, Avast explained, sent what appeared to be standard Google analytics requests to https://stats.script-protection[.]com/__utm.gif. The attacker server would then respond with a specially formed Cache-Control header, which the client would then decrypt, parse, and execute. Avoiding infecting users who were likely to be Web developers or researchers. The developers did this by examining the extensions the users already had installed and checking if the user accessed locally hosted websites. Additionally, in the event that an extension detected that the browser developer tools were opened, it would quickly deactivate its malicious functionality. Waiting three days after infection to activate malicious functionality. Checking every Google search query a user made. In the event a query inquired about a server the extensions used for command and control, the extensions would immediately cease their malicious activity.

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